Beitza 26b

1- Hillel asked Rava regarding an object that was fit at the beginning of Shabbos, became unfit and then fit again. Is that object now muktzah?

Some background to understand the question:

In general, anything that is muktzah on Shabbos cannot be moved.

If it was muktzah at the beginning of Shabbos it remains muktzah for the entire Shabbos even if  it is not muktzah any longer. The beginning of Shabbos ‘locks in’ its status of muktzah.

Example: A burning candle at the beginning of Shabbos. It remains muktzah even after extinguished.

Now, if it becomes muktzah on Shabbos, it also cannot be moved.

Hillel’s question is if something becomes muktzah on Shabbos but then becomes non muktzah on Shabbos.

Do we say that once something becomes muktzah is remains in that state all Shabbos regardless of its change?

2- The example our Gemara uses is an edible fruit that is obviously not muktzah. But then it absorbed water and making it  inedible and therefore muktzah. A while later the fruit dries and is again edible.

Do we say that once an item becomes muktzah its status cannot be changed?

Rava responded that it is muktzah. Rava’s ruling is unsuccessfully challenged and according to a second version of this discussion Rava ruled that it is not muktzah.

That is indeed the Halachah.

3- We discussed the words of Rashi that the reason for muktzah is because one needs to prepare everything prior to Shabbos.

It follows,  that if one puts away something for a specific time, and by doing that it becomes muktzah, the item automatically become non-muktzah at the end of the time he designated. No special act or thought is needed to to revert it back to its non muktzah state.

Rashi bases this on the words of Reb Achai Goan.

See here.  

Beitza 26a

1- We continued about Mishna where a dispute is presented regarding the circumstances under which it is permitted to examine a בכור on Yom Tov.

 

The Gemara clarifies that the Mishnah refers to a case where a bechor developed a temporary blemish before Yom Tov.  R’ Yehudah allows an expert to examine the animal and certify that it is indeed a מום and therefore permitted for consumption.

Reb Shimon does not allow this certification. Rashi explains that the prohibition is not an issue of muktzah because R’ Shimon does not subscribe to the prohibitions of muktza.

The reason for the restriction is that when the Rabbi declares that the animal is blemished it appears as if, through his ruling, he is making the animal usable (מתקן) which is prohibited on Yom Tov.

2- Now what if some prohibited food –איסור became mixed with permitted food – היתר ,either on Shabbos or before Shabbos, but one did not become aware of the mixture until Shabbos, is one permitted to ask a Rav to determine whether the mixture has the necessary ratio of 60:1 to nullify the prohibited substance?  And if so, he is permitted to declare the mixture permitted.

It would seem obvious that one would be permitted to do so.

Why then is it prohibited for a Rav to render a decision regarding the blemished  בכור  and yet it is permitted for a Rov to render a decision regarding a potentially prohibited mixture?

3- The Terumas HaDeshen, resolves this contradiction by differentiating between the mechanism of permitting a blemished bechor and the mechanism of permitted a mixture of איסור and היתר . When rendering a decision regarding  איסור והיתר all that is required is knowledge of the facts of the question and knowledge of halacha.

Ruling on a blemished bechor, on the other hand, requires the pronouncement of a Chacham or a Beis Din. In that way, issuing a decision concerning a bechor is a more formal declaration than a decision rendered for  איסור  והיתר .

The TA”Z (9) quotes the Magid Mishna with an  alternative resolution: The reason issuing a ruling for a bechor is prohibited is because if the ruling is negative then it becomes Muktze. Handling it then would become a problem.

This issue is only with בכור that has  a pre existing prohibition (חזקת איסור ), as opposed to the mixture which has never been declared prohibited.

Alter Rebbe regarding the TA”Z.

4 -For Yom Kippur we studied the text of a Teshuva of the Tzemach Tzedek. OC 36.

The question submitted to the Tzemach Tzedek was as follows: if eating a  כזית  of bread on Shabbos is Min Hatorah then why don’t we eat it on Yom Kippur that falls out on Shabbos?

The shiur of fasting is not to eat anything greater that a date!

 

So if one would eat a  כזית  of Challa he would be fulfilling his obligation of eating on Shabbos and still be considered fasting!

We discussed three answers presented by the צמח צדק  , the first from the   מהרלנ”ח , concerning a person who swore to eat a  half-כזית kazayis of נבלה , that even though m’d’Oraisa it would be permitted, the chachamim nevertheless prohibit him from eating it because –    חכמים העמידו דבריהם בשב ואל תעשה .

Ultimately, he explains the distinction is that when יוה”כ falls on שבת, the torah’s  commandment to fast completely voids the commandment to eat on שבת  –

ביטלה התורה לגמרי המ“ע דאכילת שבת כשחל בו יוהכ”פ

as opposed to the regular run-of-the-mill case where you could simply say דאין עשה דוחה ל“ת ועשה – etc. here there is no עשה to be דוחה .

————————————

Previous Shiur- short  notes.

1- We spoke about Yalta, the wife of Rav Nachman. See here.

2- We asked a riddle:

How is Shabbos Teshuva different from all other Shabbosim, in Halocho, according to some opinions.

Boaz suggested that Parshas Ha’azinu is the only Parsha that one cannot add more than seven Aliyos. See here.

לא מפסיקין באמצע השירה. רק ב’הזי”ו ל”ך‘. כמ”ש בגמ, ובשו”ע תכ”ח.

http://beta.hebrewbooks.org/tursa.aspx?a=oc_x2143

ואולי לכן גם לא מפסיקין בהפסוקים שלאחרי השירה.

But not all Shabbos Teshuvas are Parshas Ha’azinu….

for example, next year –

We suggested the Tosfos in Shabbos 12b, that Shabbos Teshuva is the only Shabbos that according to all one can visit the sick and pray for his well being.

התירוץ הוא:

במס’ שבת (יב) מובא שמותר לבקר את החולה ולהתפלל עליו. ואומרים: שבת היא מלזעוק ורפואה קרובה לבוא.

מקשין התוס’ שם (ע”ב) מילא לר’ יוסי שאדם נדון בכל יום, ניחא. התפילה תעזור לחולה ולכן מותרת בשבת. [וכן נפסק בשו”ע]

אבל  לפי דעת ר”מ ור”י שגזר דין של האדם הוא ביום כיפורים, אז מה יועיל התפילה ואיך מותר לבקר את החולה ולהתפלל עליו בשבת

מתרצים התוס’ שלדעת ר”מ ור”י אה”נ, מותר לבקרו והתפלל עליו רק בשבת תשובה!

 

 

Beitza 25b

 

1- A Baraisa teaches the proper way to drink wine.If one drinks it in one shot he is considered a glutton or “guzzler”.

In two shots – a well mannered person.  

In three shots a ‘showoff’.

We mentioned the story of Yaakov bringing wine for his father Yitzchok to drink.

The משך חכמה (see here) comments on the rare טראפ or cantillation on the word ויבא לו יין וישת. It is a מרכא כפולה  which is a “double trop” and found only 5 times in the entire חומש.

  

He explains that the Torah is telling us with this double  טראפ  that Yitzchak drank the wine in two sips!

2- The Gemora relates various aspects of the nature of Jews.  One of which is “they are עזים”.

Aggressive? Brazen? Arogant? Focused? Intense? Or plain chutz’pe’dik?

How does this jive with the Gemora in Yevamos that states a natural trait of Jews is them being ביישנים?

We discussed the Maharal explanation on this topic.

Found on the web:

The MAHARAL explains that there are two types of Bushah. One type comes from a person’s lack of motivation and assertiveness. This type of Bushah manifests itself in one who is easily discouraged from taking any initiative because of his shame.

The other type of Bushah is the feeling which one experiences when he realizes that someone else is greater than he, and he thus submits himself to that person.

The Jewish people are brazen with regard to the first type of Bushah, which they entirely lack. The Jewish people have a great degree of initiative and assertiveness. They are always spirited, creative, and innovative.

With regard to the other type of Bushah, however, the Jewish people excel, for they submit themselves to Hashem and recognize that they are nothing in front of Him. It is in that sense that they are Baishanim (the positive type of Bushah).

3- The Gemara states that there are 3 which are עזים (brazen):  Jews from the nations of the world, a dog (or goat) from the animal kingdom, a chicken from the birds. Additionally  the צלף  bush/tree [caper bush?]  is considered “the most brazen of all trees”.

Rashi says “ I have no clue as to why”.  Tosfos however suggests three explanations:

1. This tree produces 3 types of edibles: עלין, אביונות וקפריסין – (and elsewhere תמרות -buds ) Leaves, berries and another fruit type – the edible flower part

.

2. It is brazen since it produces new fruit every day. See Shabbos. 30b.

3. Its fermented fruit produces a sharp wine. The קטורת  was soaked in this wine to make it sharp.

From the קטורת   –

יין קפריסין ששורין בו את הציפורן כדי שתהא עזה

Rashi explains יין קפריסין  as wine coming from כפרס. Cyprus?

Recipes using צלף  fruits.

 

Salmon with Capers

4- We mentioned a phenomenal idea from the Sefer נחלת יעקב / אבני שוהם .

Here is another version of that thought. It incorporates what Hillel V suggested too!

וי״ל הכוונה עפ״י מה דאיתא במס׳ שבת (דף צ״ו ע״ב) ת״ר מקושש זה צלפחד דברי ר׳ עקיבא, אמר לו ר׳ יהודה בן בתירא, עקיבא כך או  כך כך עתיד ליתן את הדין,

אתה מוציא לעז על אותו צדיק עיי״ש.

הרי דאינו נכון לפרסם כי צלפחד מקושש הי׳.

והנה איתא עוד במס׳ שבת (דף ק״נ ע״ב) ת״ר מעשה בחסיד אחד שנפרצה לו פרץ בתוך שדהו ונמלך עלי׳ לגודרה ונזכר ששבת הוא ונמנע אותו חסיד ולא גדרה ונעשה לו נס ועלתה בו צלף עיי״ש.

ומטו בי׳ משמי׳ דהאריז״ל [והובא בספר פתח עינים להרחיד״א ז״ל במס׳ שבת ק״נ ע״ב], דאותו חסיד הי׳ גלגול של צלפחד, ובא לעולם שוב שנית לתקן עץ חילול שבת מגלגול הקדום.

 

וזהו שרמזו חכמז״ל בלשונם, ועלת״ה בו צל״ף, שהיתה עי״ז עליי׳ לנשמתו של צלפחד (אותיות צלף־חד),   

   – pointed out by Hillel Vogel, Ed

עכדה״ק.

ולפי״ז מובן היטב מהו עזותו של אילן הצלף, כי על ידי הצלף נתוודע שצלפחד מקושש הי׳, ודו״ק.

 

Beitza 25 a-b

1- So we continued the issue of animals that have been shechted and the bedika that follows.

Rav Ami bar Abba teaches that before one eats meat, the animal should have the skin removed and the limbs should be cut up.

The Gemara first tentatively suggests that perhaps the reason for this is that we require that the animal be inspected/bedika for any indications of tereifah before one can assume it is kosher. Before this is determined, eating from it would be irresponsible and prohibited.

Nevertheless, the Gemara quickly rejects this explanation for Rami bar Abba’s words, based upon our Mishnah where we find that it is permitted to eat from an animal before it is dismembered.

2- Additionally, the Gemara assumes that the ruling of Rav Huna is accepted by all.

Rav Huna’s 2 principles:

1. A) – A live animal (before it is slaughtered) has a Chazakah – חזקה – that it is בחזקת איסור  – prohibited (“Chezkas Isur”) until proven otherwise. Thus, if a question arises with regard to whether the act of Shechitah was performed properly, the animal is presumed to be forbidden due to its Chezkas Isur.

Why does an animal have a Chezkas Isur until it is known that it was slaughtered properly?

 

Rashi maintains that the animal’s Chezkas Isur is due to the prohibition of Ever Min ha’Chai,  אבר מן החי –  eating part of a live animal. When the animal is alive, it is forbidden to be eaten because of the prohibition of Ever Min ha’Chai.

[We had a heated trying to understand Rashi. As Tosfos (below) asks – how can a dead animal have such a prohibition?

Yanki T asked a good question: If an animal does not lose its אבר מן החי  status even after it is dead how can a goy eat meat that was non shechted properly!?]

Tosfos questions Rashi’s explanation. The prohibition of Ever Min ha’Chai departs as soon as the animal dies. How, then, can that prohibition be the basis of a Chezkas Isur that forbids the animal when it is dead, after the primary prohibition of Ever Min ha’Chai no longer applies?

[We mentioned the Rashba in Chulin who comments that this question is not so strong.

ומיהו אינו קשה כל כך, דאפשר לומר דכיון דמעיקרא בחזקת איסור אבר מן החי עומדת ועכשיו נמי לא נתברר אם נשחטה כהוגן, הרי היא מוחזקת מאיסור לאיסור –  רשב”א חולין ט א ד”ה בהמה

Perhaps Rashi maintains that the principle of מחזיקין מאיסור לאיסור – “Machzikin me’Isur l’Isur” applies to prohibit the animal after its death. “Machzikin me’Isur l’Isur” means that when an animal was once definitely prohibited for one reason, and now there is a doubt whether it is still prohibited due to a different reason, the rules of Chazakah still apply. The animal remains prohibited until there is conclusive proof that it is permitted].

In any case, Tosfos maintains that the Chezkas Isur of a live animal is based on the prohibition against eating any animal that was not properly slaughtered. This prohibition is an “Isur Aseh” which stems from the Mitzvas Aseh of “Tizbach v’Achalta” — “You shall slaughter and eat” (Devarim 12:21), which prohibits one from eating meat that was not slaughtered properly. Obviously, this prohibition does not depart from the animal just because it is now dead. We spoke of the Ritzva Tosfos in Shevuos 24a, who questions the existence of such an Mitzvas/Isur Aseh.

B- An animal that has been properly shechted is assumed that it is kosher even if has not been checked internally to assure that it does not have one of the 18 treifos.  The reason is that most cows/bulls are kosher and we rely on the ‘rov’.

3- We discussed this 2nd ruling of Rav Huna length.

In short, that is indeed the Halacha.

Nevertheless, the Mechaber  (39, 1) writes that the exception to this rule are the lungs that must be checked. The reason being is that although the majority of lungs are kosher there is a  מיעוט המצוי of lungs, (a definite percentage) that have issues.

4- What is this “percentage” of  מיעוט המצוי? We spoke of the various opinions with the most accepted one being 10%.  

5- We discussed the issue of kosher dairy products. The Halacha (YD 81, 2) is that if one milks a cow and when he shechts it finds that it was a treifa that milk is prohibited. We drink milk because we assume, as above, that most cows are non-treif.

The issue is that when shechting milk cows (usually when they are older and the milk produced diminishes) the majority are found to be treif!!!

We spoke of the various reasons why this is (may) not be a problem. See פתחי תשובה  above #4.

6-  We mentioned the lenient ruling that some dubious ‘hechsheirim’ (Hebrew National) rely on for not checking the lungs at all.

How? It is permitted to eat from an animal if the lung has been removed and subsequently misplaced, even though the required inspection of the organ will now be impossible.

Being that the lungs are placed on a moving conveyor belt it is viewed as missing!  

So they rely on the assumption that most animals are not tereifah. And the chumra of bedika is alleviated by the disappearing lung…..

6- The Gemara concludes that Rami bar Abba’s ruling that one needs to check the animal prior to eating is therefore explained to be דרך ארץ.

Rashi explains that it is proper to wait until the animal is cut open to ensure that it is not a treifah, although it is not against the halacha to eat it beforehand.

Tosafos questions the explanation of Rashi, as the Gemara continues and states that the halachos of ערלה demonstrates that just as one must wait three years before eating fruit of a tree, so too must a butcher not eat meat before determining that the animal is not a tereifah.

Tosafos understands that waiting is required, and not simply recommended. Therefore, Tosafos explains that although once slaughtered, an animal is not considered a tereifah, if someone eats from it too early, and the animal is later found to be a treifah, the person’s actions are שוגג and not אונס .

7- We discussed the cases of the butchers that we caught selling treifa meats. All customers needed to kasher their utensils.

The question is if one needs to do Teshuva for the inadvertent eating of the teifa meat.

The Ponim Meiros (2, 41) ruled that from our Tosafos is would seem that eating meat in case of an אונס  does not require Teshuva. Other disagree.

Enough said.

Beitza 25a

1- We discussed the Gemara where Rabbah bar R’ Huna rules that if one plugged a canal before Yom Tov it is permitted to take the fish from it on Yom Tov. The plugging of the canal or stream shows his intent to use the fish on Yom Tov. Thus the prohibition of ‘muktze’ is removed.

 

R’ Chisda, applies this ruling to the case of a newborn animal born before Yom Tov on one’s property.

 

Are these two cases similar? Or perhaps the trapping of the fish prior to Yom Tov shows his readiness to use the fish (זימון). On the other hand, knowing and seeing a newborn calf is perhaps not enough of a ‘preparation – ‘zimun’. The Gemara concludes that zimun is in fact required, except for newborn animals which do not require capture when they are close to the city.

 

2- We moved on to the next Mishna where it discusses issues related to slaughtering and transporting the slaughtered animal on Yom Tov.

 

The issue here is when one realizes, after all the meals have been prepared or eaten on Yom Tov, that his poor animal does not have much longer to live. If he were to wait to shecht it until after Yom Tov the animal will die and a significant loss would be incurred. He therefore wants to slaughter his cow on Yom Tov, lest it die and become a worthless ‘neveila’.

 

The problem is that shechting on Yom Tov is permitted only if there is sufficient  time for it to be eaten on Yom Tov. Now it’s late in the day with not much time left before Yom Tov concludes.

 

3- Under normal circumstances, from shechting to eating is a processes of a minimum of a few hours.

 

How? First one need to skin the animal. The soaking and salting adds another few hours. We then need to do the customary checking of the animal to ensure its kashrus. And of course cooking!

 

So it would seem that if, say, only a half an hour remains until Yom Tov ends, there would be no excuse to shecht this poor animal because nothing of it could be eaten before arrival of night!

 

Is there a shortcut to enable the eating of the meat closer to the shchita? Can we bypass the skinning, soaking, salting, bedika and cooking? That is the issue of the Mishna and following Gemara.

This topic is very interesting and  wide ranging with practical applications today.

 

Much more IY”H next week.

Beitza 25a

 

1- Halachah:  Fruits which a goy may have picked on Yom Tov (even for himself) is prohibited to consume until after Yom Tov. Additionally – one needs to wait  בכדי שיעשו -‘bichdei she’yasu’.

 

We learned two explanation as to the reason for this Halacha.

 

Rashi: One may not have ‘hanoeh’ from any melacha performed on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

 

Tosfos: It is a Gezeira. It is a penalty to discourage people from telling Nochrim to do melacha for them on Yom Tov.

There are four differences between the two above reasons. See here.

 

      1              2 3    4

Rashi: Hanoeh m’melocho	End of first day	Other person – Prohibited	bichdei she’yasu’ – only the melocho time	Melacha on Shabbos Beshogeg – Prohibited until after Shabbos
Tosfo:s Gezeira	End of second day only	Other person – permitted	bichdei she’yasu- includes travel time	Melacha on Shabbos Beshogeg – Permitted immediately

 

2- Our Gemara continues to talk about fruits which a goy brought that was not picked on Shabbos or Yom Tov but originated from outside the ‘techum’.

 

Now on Shabbos one can understand as to why it is a problem to eat it. But on Yom Tov, when cooking is permitted why is ‘techum’ an issue?

We mentioned that the Maharsha ask this question in Kesubus 7,b.

 

The Chasam Sofer (OC 149) has an interesting answer.

 

Techumin is not one of the 39 melochos. It is separate issur. [Most opinions are that it is Miderabonon to begin with].

 

Thus when the Torah allows us to do a melacha on Yom Tov, it addressed only the 39 melachos. Techumin was not included in this exception for eating purposes. [Just as ‘hachana is not permitted.]

Beitza 24b.

1- We returned to the Mishna on 24a that records the story of a non-Jew that offered Rabban Gamliel a gift of fish on Yom Tov. The issue is whether the Goy fished it on Yom Tov which would make it Muktza. Rabban Gamliel permitted them in principle, his opinion being that Safek Muchan is permitted, but he did not accept the fish.

Rashi writes that his non acceptance was simply because he didn’t like the Goy.  – שאני שונאו.

2- We discussed the מנחת פיתים  that was written by Reb Meir Arik. 

He discusses the topic of accepting gifts from non -Jews here.

Firstly, to publicly accept  צדקה from them is strictly forbidden since it would constitute a chilul Hashem indicating that we cannot provide for our own!   See here in Shulchan Aruch. Y”D 254.

See there that if a king sends charity to Jews it needs to be discretely distributed, lest the king take offence, but to non-Jews only.

[we spoke about governmental programs etc.]

The above concerns accepting צדקה. What about gifts?

The general rule is  ’שונא מתנות יחי.  Meaning that generally, accepting a gift is detrimental to one’s health. So it would seem that accepting gifs from a גוי  is similarly not advisable.

However Reb Meir Arik suggest that accepting a gift from a  גוי  is not a problem. See here for his reasoning.

He brings proof of this from our Gemara: Why did Rashi need to say that Rabban Gamliel didn’t accept the gift from the goy because he disliked him? Even if there was no enmity between them he would not have been allowed to accept a gift from him. So it seems that taking gifts from them is not a an issue!  

On the other hand he quotes a Yerushalmi that goes even further. We are familiar with the  famous ‘18 decrees’ that were enacted in the time of the תנאים. Some of them,  such as פת עכו”ם, oil, and wine of Goyim, יחוד  and טומאה , were enacted in order to prevent the mingling with גוים.

The Yerushalmi adds that accepting gifts from them was also enacted at the time!

3- We read the text of the  ספר חסידים where he quotes the מדרש איכה  that when upon the request of Reb Yochanon ben Zakai (to Aspayonus – Vespasian) a doctor came to heal Reb Tzadok, who had fasted for 40 years in a futile attempt to avoid the churban  – his son urged his father to pay the doctor who was a Goy. See there for the reasoning.

4- We continued further where the Gemara states that  R’ Pappa presented guidelines for accepting gifts from non- Jews when there is a concern that a מלאכה was performed to obtain or deliver the item.

The Gemara concludes that if a non-Jew brings a gift (e.g., fruit or fish) to a Jew on the first day of Yom Tov, the Jew may not benefit from that gift until after Yom Tov, and the Jew must also wait an additional period of time referred to as  בכדי שיעשה  before eating it.

5 What does ‘after Yom Tov’ mean?

Rashi explains that the gift may be used on the night of the second day of Yom Tov, after the first day of Yom Tov has elapsed. Rashi himself cites another opinion, that the gift may not be used until after the second day of Yom Tov has ended.

Rome of Olde…

We read the text of the uncharacteristically long Rashi where he writes regarding his teachers and Rabbeinu Gershom, and a letter that he received from Reb Klonimus originally from Rome Italy  that settled in Worms who was a great and aged scholar that knew all Sha”s!   

More on this topic IY”H next week.

 

Beitza 24a-b

1- We learned an interesting piece of Gemara. After mentioning  R’ Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion in regard to  צידה , the trapping of animal on Yom Tov, R’ Yosef rules in accordance with R’ Shimon ben Gamliel.

Abaye questioned the necessity for the ruling when it is not clear that the Tanna Kamma disputes this point.

R’ Yosef responds that ‘what is the difference if there is a machlokes or not when I am telling you that regardless the Halacha is like Reb Shimon?’

Abaya responds by saying גמרא גמור זמורתא תהא –  ‘do you want me to learn Gemara like a song?’. Meaning that unlike singing that requires no concentration, learning Gemara entails thinking and comprehension.

2- In regard to the expression of Abaya we discussed the famous story with Dovid Hamelech:

The Gemara in Sota 35a relates :

דרש רבא מפני מה נענש דוד מפני שקרא לדברי תורה זמירות שנאמר (תהלים קיט, נד) “זמירות היו לי חוקיך בבית מגורי

Dovid expressed in chapter 119 of Tehilim  ‘Songs were to me Your Statutes (Torah)… ’. G-D was not pleased with Dovid’s calling Torah learning ‘songs’. It seems to be belittling the seriousness of Torah. He tells Dovid that he will be punished by forgetting a simple Posuk in Chumash.

 

When did that happen?

At the very beginning of his reign David moved the ארון from קרית יערים . It  was placed on a wagon. And made it way to Yerusholayim amid great rejoicing. On the way to kiryat Ye’arim,  Uzzah, one of the drivers of the cart on which the ארון was carried, put out his hand to steady the Ark, and was punished for touching the ארון.

 ו) וַיָּבֹאוּ עַד גֹּרֶן נָכוֹן וַיִּשְׁלַח עֻזָּא אֶל אֲרוֹן הָאֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאחֶז בּוֹ כִּי שָׁמְטוּ הַבָּקָר. (ז) וַיִּחַר אַף ה’ בְּעֻזָּה וַיַּכֵּהוּ שָׁם הָאֱלֹהִים עַל הַשַּׁל וַיָּמָת שָׁם עִם אֲרוֹן הָאֱלֹהִים. (ח) וַיִּחַר לְדָוִד עַל אֲשֶׁר פָּרַץ ה’ פֶּרֶץ בְּעֻזָּה וַיִּקְרָא לַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא פֶּרֶץ עֻזָּה עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה.

David had momentarily forgotten the stipulation of the Torah, “On the shoulder shall they carry it.”

Commenting on this episode, our Sages teach that David’s forgetfulness came as a punishment for his having referred to the laws of the Torah as “songs” Tehilim 119: 54 “Your statutes were songs for me in my place of terror.”

3- The question is how did Dovid forget a פסוק?

Torah can be explained in four ways:  פשט רמז דרוש וסוד. – פרד”ס

So far we have found an explanation in סוד  and  דרוש.

סוד-

The Alter Rebbe explains this story In Tanya and elsewhere.

Dovid’s happiness with learning Torah was a result of his being cognizant of the fact that as is known, all the worlds – ,עליונים ותחתונים , are dependent on the meticulous performance of a single mitzvah.

He therefore labeled Torah learning as a song – expressing happiness because he was overjoyed when he contemplated how the entire world is of no account, relative to one minor specific detail of the Torah.

But there is a more important aspect of Torah that supersedes all the above. And that is that Torah is G-D’s wisdom to whom all these worlds are considered nothing.

See below for the words in Tanya.

4- The above is an explanation based on Chassidus. But what is the simple ‘Peshat’ of Dovid ‘forgetting’ a Posuk?

דרוש

We mentioned the interesting explanation of Reb Yonason Eibishutz.

Briefly:

The Radak writes that Dovid erred in thinking that the commandment to carry the ארון by hand was only applicable to the time in the desert. It did not apply in the generations that followed that particular time.  

Why? Reb Yonason say that Dovid’s logic went as follows: After the Nesiim donated the 6 wagons at the Chanukas Hamizbeach, Moshe Rabeinu A”H gave them to the tribes of Gershon and Merori for they were tasked with hauling the heavy pieces of the Mishkan.

Now in order to avoid jealousy between the Nesiim, since not all the parts carried by Gershon and Merori were of equal ‘Kedusha’, the wagons were switched from time to time. Thus all the Nesiim’s gifts were alternately shared in usage of all the wagons.

The ארון, on the other hand, was carried on the shoulders. For once it would be placed on a wagon it would need to remain that way (for whatever reason) – Thus, placing the  ארון on a wagon would cause jealousy towards the 2 Nesiim that donated that particular wagon!

However, once these wagons went out of service this commandment was made obsolete and the ארון would indeed be allowed to be carried on a wagon.

Dovid’s error was his reasoning. For the true reason the  ארון was not to be placed on a wagon had nothing to do with a potential for jealousy.

The Medrash says that the real reason the ארון needed to be carried ‘on the shoulders’ was to signify that Torah study needs to be a burden, a yoke on the person. – עול של תורה . One needs to ‘horove’, feel an obligation to toil, concentrate and spend much time in learning Torah.

This lesson of ‘iyun’ of Torah, being eternal, never changes and as a result the ארון always needs to be shoulder-carried.

Dovid’s thinking was that to achieve in learning on does not need such diligence. Hence he called the study of Torah ‘songs’. As a result he erred in the reason for the commandment of carrying the ארון.

5- We mentioned the most interesting take of the תפארת ישראל of the topic of ‘Singing while learning’. Here.

We find many places in Sha”s where a Mishna is stated and the Gemara comes along and questions the Mishna. The Gemara then says “חסורי מחסרא”, meaning that there are some words missing in the text of the Mishna.

Why then,  the תפארת ישראל asks, was the Mishna not edited with the correct text?

He answers that the Mishnayos, prior to them being written, were studied and transmitted verbally. [At the time writing the Mishna was prohibited]. In order to assist in the memorization,  they were sung with a particular song. The words of every Mishna fit to a particular tune thereby easing the memorization.

If we were to add the missing words it would cause chaos and the memorization process would be diminished!

This idea is truly unique and original.

———————-

Tanya- Kuntres Achron – #6.

As is known, all the worlds, the exalted and the lowly, are dependent on the meticulous performance of a single mitzvah.

For example, if an altar offering is valid then a Supernal Union in the Sefirot is effected, and all the worlds are elevated to receive their life-force and spiritual sustenance.However, if [the celebrant] altered the precise requirements of the law — if, for example, he received the blood of the offering with his left hand, or in an invalid vessel, or if there was a separation

then all the elevations of the worlds that would have been accomplished are nullified, as is

the life-force and sustenance that they would have received from the Source of Life, the Ein Sof, blessed be He.

So, too, through the use of valid tefillin there is revealed the Supernal Intellect of Zu”n, Za and Malchut of Atzilut, the source of life for all the worlds.

Yet through [the omission of] one required detail they are invalidated, and the Intellect

departs.

In the case of a detailed requirement of a prohibitory commandment, transgression brings about (G‑d forbid) a descent in all the worlds.

This was the delight of King David, may he rest in peace, as he sang to gladden his heart in his Torah study during his time of anguish.

He was overjoyed when he contemplated how the entire world is of no account, relative to one minor specific detail of the Torah. So why was he punished? The Alter rebbe continues:

However, for extolling the Torah with this quality, saying, “[Your statutes] were songs for me,” he was punished. G‑d reproved him: “You call them songs?!”

For indeed, this quality [of the Torah], that all the worlds are nothingness compared to one detail of it,

is [but] of  the externality, of the profound Supernal Thought.

Relative to the Infinite One, all the worlds are as absolute naught, sheer nothingness, nonexistent.

For “You were [the same] before the world was created, [You are the same since the world has been created].”

Being of absolutely no account relative to G‑d, all the worlds effect no change in Him.

Hence, the internal aspect of the Torah too (which is wholly united with G‑d) is not at all to be lauded as being the animating force of all the worlds, for relative to the internal aspect of the Torah they are reckoned as nothingness itself.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beitza 24a

1- Our Mishna discusses details regarding trapping on Yom Tov.  

A contradiction is noted: Our Mishnah permits trapping wild animals and birds on Yom Tov and a Baraisa prohibits it.

The contradiction concerning wild animals is resolved by distinguishing between R’ Yehudah and the Rabanan’s position.

Rabbah bar R’ Huna resolves the contradiction regarding birds by distinguishing between a large enclosure and a small enclosure.

R’ Ashi offers two ways of defining a large enclosure and a small enclosure.

2- Why is trapping on Yom Tov prohibited? If igniting a fire and cooking for the purpose of eating is permitted then trapping should be allowed as well!

We discussed the opinions of Rashi and Tosfos in regard to the general concept of what ‘melachos’ are permitted to be performed on Yom Tov. We discussed this at an earlier Shiur.

beitza tosfos 3a

tosfos, beitza 3a, Rabbeinu Nesanel

3- Our Gemara mentions a bird called Dror describing it “a bird that does not accept discipline”.  Meaning that it is hard to catch even if it is in a closed room.

4- We discussed the rather testy machlokes between the Shach and the Taz regarding the Kashrus of this mysterious bird.

See here and here.

Whereas the Taz emphatically states that it is Kosher since that is the fowl used by a Metzora of which the Posuk describes as ‘צפרים טהורות’, the Shach argues that the Dror Bird is a generic name for free-flying birds and that some are Kosher while others are not.

The Shach, based of the Radak identifies the Dror as a אירונדלא bird.

Fallow bird perhaps?

 

למעשה קיימת מסורת רציפה של אכילת הדרור בקהילות ישראל עד לאמצע המאה העשרים, בשל תפוצתו הנרחבת של העוף וזיקתו למשכנות האדם. זמינותו עשתה אותו לעוף מאכל שקל להשיגו, בעיקר בחברות מסורתיות, או בקרב עניים, שנהגו לנצל כל מקור מזון אפשרי. מסורת זו תועדה בין היתר במזרח אירופה, באיטליה, באנגליה, במרוקו, בתימן ובארץ ישראל. בעיר ליוורנו העיד על כשרות הדרורים השו”ב י. הכהן בספרו “זבחי כהן” (י”ל בשנת 1832). הוא מנה את הדרור (Passera) בתוך רשימה של 30 מיני עופות בעלי מסורת טהרה בתוספת ציורים המתארים אותם (תמונה 4). בחברות שפע פחת השימוש בדרורים לאכילה, עד אשר עלה החשש לאבדן רציפות המסורת. בעקבות זאת, התפשט מנהג בחלק מקהילות גרמניה לשחוט את הדרור בפרהסיה לשם שימור המסורת לדורות הבאים (ראו כאן עדות מצולמת). בימינו התחדש המנהג לשימור מסורת העופות הכשרים והוא מתקיים מדי פעם ב”סעודות המסורת“. ראו סקירה נרחבת של מסורת כשרות הדרור בספרו של ז. עמר, ‘מסורת העוף’, נווה צוף, ה’תשס”ד (עמ’ 69-87).

 

Freedom bird: https://www.ijn.com/the-bird-not-the-bell/

(The views shared by some of the cited sources does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of Shiur Points and shall not be misconstrued as an endorsement of views, opinions, or any other content from cited sources. Ed.)

Dror Bird

 דרור הבית

 

 

Beitza 23 a-b. (2)

 

1- Our  Mishnah records three lenient rulings of R’ Elazar ben Azaryah and the disagreement of others concerning these rulings.

The third item concerns the combing the hair of an animal with two types of combs. קדור  and קרצוף.

A Baraisa explains that קרוד refers to combing an animal with a metal comb that has small teeth and קרצוף refers to combing an animal with a wooden comb with large teeth.

 

The issue is the wound that a comb may cause to the animal when the pulling out of hairs occurs while combing. Wounding an animal or a human  is an Av Melocho.

R’ Shimon rules that all combs are permitted for even if a wound is caused it would be permitted since all an unintended transgressions are  permitted.  דבר שאינו  מתכוין

2- The Mishnah discusses the tumah status of a child’s wagon as well as the dispute regarding the use of the wagon on Shabbos on an unpaved floor.

What is is ‘a child’s wagon’?

Rashi’s opinion is that it is a radio flyer. Tosfos says that it is a three wheel  gadget that children learn to walk with.

3- When a stroller is pushed over sand or soft earth a groove might be left in the path of the wheels. Another example: dragging a bench or couch on the dir.

Is such a practice is permitted on Shabbos? It is similar to plowing, one of the thirty-nine prohibited melachos.

Our Gemara frames the issue as a dispute between R’ Yehudah and R’ Shimon.

R’ Yehudah maintains that an unintended outcome דבר שאינו  מתכוין is prohibited whereas R’ Shimon holds that it is permitted.

Accordingly,  R’ Yehudah prohibits using a stroller on Shabbos and R’ Shimon permits pushing the stroller.

4- What about if the pushing the stroller and dragging the bench will positively cause the dirt to be dug up.

Even R’ Shimon would agree that it is prohibited. This concept of an inevitable consequence is called פסיק רישיה.

We discussed the rationale of this idea. After all, although it is inevitable to occur, the person does not intend it to happen.

Some suggested that if something must happen then it means that the person must mean it.

5-        – דלא ניחא חי’.  פסיק רישיה   

We mentioned the opinion of the Aruch , written by Reb Noson of Rome, Italy, , who holds that a פסיק רישיה  is permitted if one has no benefit from performing the action.

What is his rationale?

Some explain that his opinion is based on the understanding that (as above) a pesik reisha is forbidden because it is as though one actually intended for the forbidden result to occur, since it was inevitable.

However, if one doesn’t benefit from the forbidden result, even if it’s inevitable, clearly it is unintended since one doesn’t benefit.

Others (תוספות ד”ה טפי ) .say that since he doesn’t benefit from it it is a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.